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147 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
David Brown ("Brown") worked as a chef in a hotel in Pinehurst, North
Carolina. On Sunday, August 24, 1980, Brown disc-jockeyed a party, drinking
a substantial amount of alcohol and taking at least five amphetamines during the
party. Brown regularly wore a distinctive silver ring; however, he averred that he
took the ring off while playing records at the party.'
Around 11:30 p.m. Sunday night, Brown left the party and went to a night-
club with some friends. Around 2:10 a.m. Monday morning, police officers
observed Brown walking barefoot, staggering, and carrying his shoes on a
highway outside of the nightclub. Brown was given a ride to the Pinehurst Hotel,
his place of employment, and entered the kitchen of the hotel around 2:45 a.m.
Brown was seen making a telephone call shortly after arriving at the hotel, and
left the hotel at approximately 3:00 a.m. Brown testified that he arrived back at
the hotel at 6:00 a.m., but a co-worker of Brown's testified that he arrived back
at the hotel at 7:00 a.m., and that Brown was not wearing his distinctive silver
ring.
2
Diane Chalfinch ("Diane"), and her nine-year-old daughter Christina, lived
in the same apartment complex as Brown and were last seen alive at approxi-
mately 1:00 a.m. on Monday morning. Brown developed testimony at an eviden-
tiary hearing that suggested that Diane and Christina were seen as late as 5:00
a.m. on Monday morning. Diane did not show up at work on Monday or
Tuesday morning, at which point her co-workers telephoned the police. When
the police arrived at the Chalfmches' apartment, they discovered both Diane and
Christina had been stabbed to death.3
Several pieces of physical evidence connected Brown to the murders.
Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence was the discovery, during autopsy,
of Brown's distinctive silver ring beneath Diane's liver. In December of 1980,
Brown was tried and convicted of first-degree murder of both Diane and Chris-
tina. At the sentencing phase of trial, the jury sentenced Brown to death for both
murders. Brown's appeals were all denied.4
Brown filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 1987 in the Western District
of North Carolina. The district court denied Brown's claims of error from the
1. Brown v. French, 147 F.3d 307, 309 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Brown, 147 F.3d at 309.
3. Id at 309-10.
4. Id at 310.
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guilt phase, granted the writ on three of his penalty phase claims, and did not
decide ten other penalty phase claims.' The United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, affirmed the denials of the guilt phase claims, reversed the
granting of the writ on the three penalty phase claims, and ordered a remand for
consideration of the ten claims not ruled on by the district court.6 The court also
ordered that new evidence, which had become available to Brown's habeas
counsel, be considered on remand.'
On remand, a United States magistrate recommended denial of the ten
remaining claims. The district court adopted the recommendation and denied
the writ. Brown then filed a motion to reconsider, treated by the district court
as a Rule 59(e)8 motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied.'
Brown appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held that: (1) the state's
actions in withholding or concealing information from the defense did not
deprive Brown of due process of law under Brady v. Magyland,' (2) the accumula-
tion of the prosecutor's misconduct did not, under Kyles v. Wbitly," deprive
Brown of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel; and
(3) whether the introduction at the penalty phase, after having not been intro-
duced at the guilt phase, of Brown's cellblock confession violated or did not
violate Brown's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, under
Teague v. Lane,12 the claim was barred. 3
5. Id
6. See Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 501 (4th Cir. 1989).
7. Brwn, 891 F.2d at 501.
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 59(e).
9. Brown, 147 F.3d at 310.
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
12. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague essentially held that a capital defendant at federal habeas is.
entitled only to the benefits of good law which existed at the end of the defendant's direct appeal.
Thus, any new obligation on the state, which did not exist at the end of the defendant's direct
appeal, that is asserted by the defendant at the federal habeas stage will not be a valid ground for
granting the writ, absent two narrow exceptions not at issue in this case.
13. The court also ruled on a contention raised by the state. According to the state, Brown's
notice of appeal appeared to cover only the district court's denial of his Rule 59(e) motion to alter
or amend the judgment, and not the underlying order that denied the writ of habeas corpus. Thus,
the state argued, the standard of review under Rule 59(e) is abuse of discretion and that standard
should be applied to Brown's appeal, rather than the de novo review normally conducted at habeas
appeal. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1991). The court
ruled against the state and held that the standard of review would be de novo and not abuse of
discretion. The language of the notice of appeal given by Brown stated that Brown appealed "the
Order entered on July 29, 1997, denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the final judgment
under Rule 59(e) and reaffirming the May 2, 1997, Order dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and each and every part of that order." Brwn, 147 F.3d
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II. Anaysi's/Application in Virginia
Brown claimed that the prosecutor's efforts to withhold and conceal infor-
mation from the defense deprived him of his right to due process of law.14 The
court held that to succeed on this claim, Brown had to meet the standard articu-
lated in Brady v. Maryland'5 Brown alleged three instances in which the prosecu-
tor withheld or attempted to conceal material, exculpatory evidence from the
defense. 6
Brown first claimed that his rights under Brady were violated when the
prosecutor withheld the statements of a store owner who claimed to have seen
Diane Chalfinch alive with her daughter in his store around 4:45 a.m. on Monday
morning. The court held that if the statement were believed, it would only have
reduced the time frame in which Brown could have committed the murders."
Accordingly, the court ruled that the withheld statements did not satisfy the Brady
requirement of materiality, which was defined in United States v. Bagley"8 as a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent if the new evidence had been admitted at trial.' 9
Brown next contended that the state failed to conduct an investigation into
David Martin ("Martin"), a former boyfriend of Diane Chalfinch, who left a
"terse" note at the Chalfinches' door the Saturday before the murders. Accord-
ing to Brown, had the police investigated Martin, they would have found that
Martin fit the description of a man seen jumping out of the Chalfinches' apart-
ment building one day after the Chalfinch murders. However, at the time of the
crime, witnesses placed Martin in Macon, Georgia, where he attended law school.
The court quickly dismissed this claim because any connection there may have
been between the note and the jumper was not enough to undermine confidence
in the outcome of the trial. °
at 310. The court stated that it would liberally construe such language in the notice of appeal to
indicate an intent to appeal the original order dismissing the habeas petition. The court's holding
here shows that defense counsel may make an appeal of both the order dismissing the habeas
petition and any order regarding a motion similar to a Rule 59(e) motion. The court will still apply
the more liberal de novo review standard, rather than an abuse of discretion standard. Id at 311.
The court's ruling on Brown's third contention of error will not be discussed further in this
summary. It provides no new insight into capital law in Virginia. The court held that Brown's claim
that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the introduction of his cellblock
confession at the penalty phase had no precedent to support it. Thus, the court ruled that to find
for Brown would require the creation of a new rule. The court ruled that such a finding is barred
by Teague. Id at 314.
14. Brown, 147 F.3d at 311.
15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the government violates a defendant's constitutional
right to due process when it withholds material, exculpatory evidence from the defense).
16. Brown, 147 F.3d at 311.
17. Id
18. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
19. Brown, 147 F.3d at 311-12.
20. Id. at 312.
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Brown further contended that the prosecutor violated Brown's rights when
the prosecutor had a witness moved from one hotel to another to keep defense
counsel from gaining access to him and when the prosecutor told the witness not
to talk to the defense attorney. The court dismissed this contention because the
testimony which the defense attorney could have obtained from the moved
witness only duplicated other testimony presented at trial. Thus, the prosecutor's
conduct did not undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial.2
Finally, Brown contended that the prosecutor denied defense counsel's
request to have access to and to inspect the crime scene. The Fourth Circuit had
previously ruled, before remanding the case to the district court, that this action
by the prosecutor did not rise to the level of constitutional error, but that it
would reconsider the claim if Brown developed additional evidence on remand.'
Having developed this evidence, in the form of the three other claims rejected
above, Brown sought reconsideration of the prosecutor's conduct, arguing that
the cumulative effect of all of the actions by the prosecutor violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Acknowledging that his claim was not a typical
Sixth Amendment claim, Brown contended that the prosecutor's actions made
his trial so unfair that it was impossible for any counsel to assist him effectively.
The court ruled against Brown's claim, finding that none of the actions of the
prosecutor, by themselves, amounted to a constitutional violation. Nor did the
actions, when taken as a whole, undermine the confidence in the outcome of the
trial when considered in conjunction with the strong evidence of guilt. 3
Nevertheless, the court did note that in each of these instances, the prosecu-
tor acted "unethically and improperly" in withholding evidence from the
defense.24 The court aptly categorized the prosecutor's conduct in this case.
However, as the court further noted, "however reprehensible we may find the
actions of the prosecutor, the focus of a Brady claim is not on him, but rather on
the character of the evidence that he has withheld."
2
The court's ruling on the issue of its primary duty regarding prosecutorial
misconduct is technically correct.26 Thus, it is worth noting that defense counsel
will not be able to succeed at federal habeas appeal on an issue of this sort simply
because the prosecutor's conduct was morally reprehensible. Such conduct,
however, can and should be the subject of a bar complaint based on the prosecu-
tor's violation of his ethical duties under the Virginia Code of Professional
21. Idtat 312-13.
22. See Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1989).
23. Brown, 147 F.3d at 313-14.
24. Id at 312.
25. Id
26. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (holding that if suppression of
evidence results in constitutional error, the error is based on the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor).
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Responsibility.27 The unethical actions by the prosecutor would need to be
particularly alleged by defense counsel in a bar complaint.
Brown's defense counsel did excellent work to create a federal issue from
the prosecutor's misconduct. The allegation that the cumulation of the prosecu-
tor's conduct amounted to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was creative, and the court accepted this as at least a possibility for habeas relief.
It is interesting to note that the court ruled that to prevail on his creative
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Brown would have to meet the "high
threshold" that, but for the prosecutor's misconduct, it was reasonably probable
that the result of the outcome would have been different.2" In Strickland v.
Washington,' the seminal case announcing the standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that all
the defendant must show is a reasonable probability that the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. This is not a "high threshold" according to
the Strickland Court. The Court took great pains to make it clear that to meet the
standard, the defendant need not show it was certain, or even that it was more
probable than not, that the result of the outcome would have been different.3 0
It is hardly a "high threshold" to prove a reasonable probability, especially when
that probability need not even rise to the level of more probable than not. It
cannot hurt to continue to remind courts of the real standard established by
Strickland. The Fourth Circuit, in particular, does not yet seem to understand it.3
Jason J. Solomon
27. See VA. SUP. CT. R., Pt. 6, Sec. II (Michie 1997) (providing that in felony cases, a prosecu-
tor is under an ethical duty to turn over all exculpatory evidence and to not obstruct defense access
to witnesses).
28. Brown, 147 F.3d at 314.
29. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
31. See also Case Note of Smith v. Moore, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 129 (1998).
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